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Changing the Angle: Does the Notion of 
Non-Territorial Autonomy Stand on Solid 
Ground? 
The ideas of non-territorial autonomy (NTA) for ethnic groups are used increasingly often, but 
in such a way, that perhaps it would be prudent at this point to take a step back and ask what 
some may already view as a naïve question; namely, to ask why the notion of NTA is 
necessary and what added value it brings about. I would argue that the relative popularity of 
the concept rests not on real achievements in policy-making or research but rather on several 
taken for granted assumptions. The latter ones require a highly critical examination, and this 
brings us to a reconsideration of the role the notion may play and the scope of its potential 
application. 
 
Alexander Osipov, July 2013 
ECMI Issue Brief #29 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Non-territorial autonomy (NTA) is an old and a 
new issue at the same time. The idea took more 
or less clear shape by the late 19
th
 century, but 
the political and scholarly debates at the turn of 
the 20
th
 century and also of 1920-30s were 
essentially forgotten for decades. Although the 
rebirth of NTA in English-speaking academia 
occurred around 20 years ago
1
 and the number 
of publications is still growing slowly, one can 
already reflect on the major patterns of how the 
notion is being mastered and utilized. The idea 
and the related terminologies are used more and 
more often, but in such a way that one may 
already ask a naïve naive questions as to why the 
notion of NTA is necessary and what added 
value it brings about. I would argue that the 
relative popularity of the concept rests 
exclusively on several taken for granted 
assumptions which deserve examination with a 
highly critical eye. 
 
Yet today, there are relatively few 
empirical studies on the ways NTA is used as a 
category of practice in politics, law-making and 
civil activism.
2
 Within most academic texts 
NTA is employed as an analytical category and 
mostly for normative rather than descriptive 
purposes. In the meantime, there is no uniform 
definition and no commonly accepted 
understanding of what NTA may actually mean. 
The whole range of NTA‟s applications can be 
lumped into three basic, partly overlapping 
clusters that are (1) a general principle under 
which people can individually or jointly pursue 
their identity-based interests in a variety of 
institutional settings;
3
 (2) certain organizational 
forms (usually, a centralized public-law 
corporation based on individual membership);
4
 
and (3) certain functions and authorities of an 
organization (the latter approach often assumes 
delegation of public competences to non-
governmental  institutions).
5
 Needless to say, the 
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related adjectives like „cultural‟, „non-
territorial‟, „national-cultural‟, „personal‟ and so 
forth also acquire numerous and ever-changing 
meanings and implications.
6
  
 
Taken for descriptive purposes, the 
notion either has no identifiable substantive 
referents or has too many of them; in other 
words, there is no clarity on what exactly this 
term applies to. The general principle of 
welcoming collective activities on ethnic 
grounds can be attached to a variety of 
initiatives, setups and social forms including 
institutions segregated along ethnic or linguistic 
lines. The idea of creating a public-law 
corporation which would encompass and 
structure an entire ethnic group has been more or 
less well developed since at least the seminal 
works of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer in late 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 century.
7
 However, this 
institutional design materialized only in several 
specific cases all of which can hardly be 
considered a success story (such as the 
unfortunate bi-communal statehood of Cyprus 
after 1960).
8
 Lastly, there are only a few 
examples of public authorities and jurisdictions 
having been granted to non-governmental 
institutions in the fields pertinent to minority 
issues, and it is not obvious that such cases 
constitute a distinct research area and give rise 
to a meaningful scholarly debate. 
 
Despite the fact that in practice NTA applies 
only in a few specific situations, the notion 
remains popular as a normative construct, an 
ideal model or a prescription for the future. In 
my view, the popularity of NTA can be 
explained exclusively by a common silent 
acceptance of several doubtful assumptions. 
 
II. GROUPISM 
The first and the major proposition on this list is 
a mystification typical for ethnic and minority 
studies, i.e. „the tendency to treat ethnic groups, 
nations and races as substantial entities to which 
interests and agency can be attributed‟.9 If ethnic 
groups are perceived as collective individuals 
possessing will, consciousness and ability to act 
as such, and internally structured social entities, 
then it would be in some way logical to interpret 
all ethnicity-related activities as the internal life 
of groups per se and to seek a more efficient 
corporate-type internal organization of those 
groups. In other words, „autonomy‟ is regarded 
as an attribute of an intrinsic ethnic group as 
such or an organization serving as an 
organizational shell for an entire ethnic category. 
 
This assumption (which Rogers 
Brubaker labels as „groupism‟)10 is often 
manifested explicitly; it is also conducted 
indirectly at times. The notion of „autonomy‟ 
implies the existence of an autonomous social 
entity, and being taken in regard to ethnicity-
based setting, the term may be interpreted as the 
re-affirmation of the independence and agency 
of a group. The adjective „non-territorial‟, on the 
one hand, equates ethnicity-based organizational 
forms with political and administrative units 
known as territorial autonomy; on the other, it 
implicitly indicates that territorial arrangement 
can also be ethnicity-based, or in other words, 
that an ethnic group can exercise political power 
and public administration over a certain 
territory. 
 
The origins of groupism are a complex 
issue which lies beyond the scope of this brief, 
and only a short comment would be appropriate 
here. In the majority of its manifestations, this 
worldview turns out to be unreflective and to 
lack a clear theoretical underpinning. It is not 
equivalent to essentialism and can be better 
regarded as a discursive trend rather than a 
coherent approach.
11
  Few scholars engaging in 
ethnic studies deliberately stick to essentialism, 
but for many their allegiance to constructivism 
remains merely a hollow declaration. At best, 
the popular versions of constructivism are 
confined to irrelevant issues, such as the internal 
heterogeneity of groups, the existence of 
multiple group affiliations, shifting boundaries, 
and changing cultural content. Another version 
of folk constructivism combines the 
acknowledgement of social construction as an 
act of group creature with subsequent attitudes 
towards groups as substantive entities, social 
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actors and bearers of some quasi-natural 
„identities‟. 
 
At first glance, groupism poses as a mental 
and discursive inertia multiplied with common 
sense assumptions, and images of a group as a 
social agent serve as convenient explanatory 
tools. There must be something else that 
explains the durability of groupist assumption in 
the perceptions of autonomy. One of those 
circumstances is the common practice for 
rationalizing the image of „the collective 
individual‟ with the idea of political 
representation and with the belief in voting 
mechanisms. 
 
III. RATIONALIZATION 
THROUGH ELECTIONS 
There is a widespread belief that people 
belonging to an ethnic group can jointly delegate 
their will to a representative body through a 
process of inner democracy, ideally, by casting a 
vote. This well-intentioned belief has been 
inspired to a large degree by the recent debates 
in the framework of „participation‟, which often 
revolve around the ideas of consocialism, or, in 
a broader sense, of combining power-sharing 
with segmental autonomy.
12
 „Participation‟ is 
already treated as the third key element of 
minority protection (after non-discrimination 
and „identity‟ preservation) and is currently 
regarded as a multi-dimensional normative 
framework encompassing individual 
involvement in group activities, a group‟s 
inclusion within the broader society and group 
members entitlement and ability to fully benefit 
from their citizenship rights.
13
  
 
All of these interpretations as a rule 
imply the need for the group‟s internal 
organization to function through representative 
organs and the democratic procedures under 
which the constituency forms its representative 
structures. Within both frameworks the term 
„autonomy‟ often comes to the forefront. The 
notion of participation entails such themes as 
legitimacy of group „representation‟ and the 
accountability of the representatives. In other 
words, an ethnic group can function as an 
autonomous polity and participate in public life 
if it is organized as a quasi-nation with elected, 
authoritative and accountable systems of 
governance.
14
 The issue at stake is thus the 
delegation of authority from grass-root group 
members to the governing bodies with a 
mandate to represent the community before the 
outside world and to arrange its internal affairs. 
 
This agenda obviously comes out of the 
same groupist assumption, and rests on the 
erroneous conflation of a social group based on 
interests (like a social movement) with that of a 
group based on categorization.
15
 Respectively, 
categorization is viewed as ontological „identity‟ 
which is in turn equated with common values 
and emotional affiliation, and this leads to a 
conclusion that an identity-based group must be 
regarded as an internally cohesive entity bound 
with internal solidarity. This partly explains why 
its adherents did not ask and answer two crucial 
questions. One question has to do with the 
reasons of transplanting perceptions of statehood 
and citizenry into a completely different 
institutional environment such as that of ethnic 
categorization, and manifestations within society 
of ethnic affiliations with a completely different 
social meaning. The other question has to do 
with the fact that in modern states (with rare 
exceptions being those countries with deep intra-
societal cleavages and/or societies in a state 
protracted social conflict)
16
 the turnout of people 
directly participating in ethnicity-related 
activities varies significantly. Quite often just a 
minor segment of the population who can be 
deemed minority members join minority 
organizations and partake in their initiatives.  
 
Respectively, the assumption that a 
minority representative body can function as a 
national parliament, where deputies of different 
views and party backgrounds adequately voice 
the concerns of their constituents, engage in 
thoughtful deliberations and then elaborate 
balanced decisions also looks ill-informed and 
ungrounded. Both the candidates who run for 
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office and the citizens who vote for or against 
them belong to the same activist environment 
and share a similar ethnocentric vision; others 
are excluded, and these are the people who in 
principle don‟t feel like playing the game of 
framing their interests in terms of group claims. 
 
The idea of „rational representation‟ based 
on the conscious and formalized investment of 
individual wills in „trustees‟ - who legitimately 
represent the whole ontological group and serve 
as it actual replacement („practical group‟ vis-à-
vis „group on paper‟ in terms of Bourdieu)17 - 
must be conceived as nothing more than a 
fictitious idea like le contrat social. This 
theoretic invention may serve practical purposes 
and legitimize certain claims, but it is not clear 
that it can be instrumentalized as a descriptive 
and analytical tool.  
 
IV. WHAT IS ‘GENUINE’ 
REPRESENTATION? 
Many authors resort to the category of 
„representation‟ and assert that such a notion as 
„substantive representation‟18, i.e. the ability of 
trustees to adequately express and defend 
interests of their constituencies, must be 
applicable to ethnic groups.
19
 In the meantime, 
few if any people question the very validity of 
such thing as „interests‟ or, moreover, „genuine‟ 
interests of a group as such. It is also unclear 
which claims or stances may be identified as 
„dominant‟ and thus legitimate within a certain 
group (as Erin Jenne suggests)
20
 and which 
criteria should be taken into account in the 
course of measuring public support for certain 
claims. 
 
Alternatively, we can treat an ethnic 
minority or ethnic group as an imagined class of 
people who are subject to a certain imposed 
categorization, who then find themselves having 
to adapt to such categorization and who thus opt 
for a variety of adaptation strategies. The entire 
range of opportunities cannot be confined to 
either active participation in the „community‟ or 
to full exit and further assimilation into the 
majority; there is a multitude of choices in 
between, which are also permanently revised, 
transformed and renegotiated within changing 
contexts.
21
 Ethnic activism thus appears to be 
just one type of many strategies available. 
Someone may find treating it as the norm and all 
the rest as negligible deviances, but such an 
approach is obviously in conflict with the basic 
rationale of human rights and minority 
protection. People who may be unsatisfied with 
ethnic activism in principle or who may see no 
space for themselves within an activist 
environment deserve at least the same amount of 
respect and recognition as those who subscribe 
to such things do.  
 
Respectively, it would hardly be 
accurate to measure the potential demand for 
services provided in minority languages, or 
minority-related schooling, or cultural activities 
through the scale of ethnic activism. There exists 
a temptation to confuse the needs and demands 
of ethnic activists with the entire range of 
problems and concerns that people identifiable 
as minority members may face. First and 
foremost, special participatory mechanisms have 
been designed to be most user-friendly and 
utilizable for ethnic spokespersons. However, 
especially considering that the accommodation 
of ethnic activism and group claims may very 
well be the central issue surrounding minority 
protection, the former cannot be a replacement 
for the latter. 
 
Within the scholarly literature, one can 
already find two (fortunately, still embryonic 
and vaguely formulated) ideas on ways to 
circumvent the inactivity of would-be minority 
members in electing representative bodies. The 
first has to do with bracketing out non-
participants in minority activities, asserting that 
such a non-participating person be treated as one 
who has made a choice to be viewed by others in 
the society as having voluntarily relinquished 
their mandate of representing their group to 
people elected by others.
22
 The other idea as 
mentioned above envisages compulsory 
membership in ethnicity-based corporate 
organizations. This idea is justified on the 
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ground that modern human rights defends the 
right of association, according to some authors, 
only with regard to private law institutions and 
that this right lacks full legal clarity with respect 
to the right to refrain from participation in 
associations.
23
 The conclusion of this idea is thus 
that public law associations with mandatory 
membership do comply with modern human 
rights law – to the letter, in fact. 
 
There may be no doubt that all 
recommendations of this kind, such as the 
keeping of ethnic electoral registers, the 
institution of public voting for ethnic 
representative bodies, or the legitimizing of 
representative bodies through the official 
recognition of their exclusive and privileged 
status are feasible in technical terms. Moreover, 
there is nothing technically impossible in 
indirectly forcing people to enroll on ethnic 
registers and to require membership in corporate 
organizations on ethnic grounds - even in 
countries conceived as liberal democracies. Such 
systems can be functional, but, first, there are no 
reasons to treat this as „group autonomy‟ or 
„group representation‟ from a scholarly 
perspective; second, from a pragmatic point of 
view, the consequences are not that clear, and 
those who offer such solutions would perhaps 
best be advised to think twice. 
 
There is no need to explain that if such 
arrangements and measures are implemented, 
ultimately private life and the freedom of 
association would certainly be in jeopardy – 
such an outcome is clear. If the right to choose 
one‟s own ethnic and cultural affiliations, as 
well as the right to join or not to join certain 
organizations are questioned and restricted, even 
if on indirect grounds, in this very context, there 
would be no obstacles to the imposition of other 
restrictions for the sake of „participatory rights‟, 
„minority integrity‟ or something else of this 
nature.  
 
 
 
 
V. WHO IS TO PAY? 
It is already commonplace for most scholars 
who write about NTA to express the opinion that 
the funding of „autonomies‟ through the taxation 
of registered members of the respective ethnic 
groups (i.e., the idea advocated by Renner and 
Bauer) is barely feasible in the modern world - 
or at least generates insurmountable problems.
24
 
This implies that autonomous entities must be 
funded through the redistribution of public 
funds, or, in other words, that the welfare states 
will pay the bills. This silent assumption also 
raises questions and concerns about NTA‟s 
feasibility and the potential outcomes. First, 
modern capitalism experiences turbulence, and 
one can hardly expect that the public funding of 
minority institutions would be a universally 
applicable model while segmental autonomy 
remaining without a stable financing cannot be 
deemed viable, especially when private funding 
is never guaranteed.  
 
Second, the issues of entitlement to 
membership and voting, of collection and 
redistribution of public funds, and of individual 
access to services and benefits will inevitably be 
raised and most likely be followed by 
suggestions of restrictive and discriminatory 
measures . It should come as no surprise that 
scholarly and political debates surrounding 
autonomy and representation quite often lead to 
the issue of „ethno-business‟, i.e. the usage of 
ethnicity-based organizations and ethnic 
mobilization for the purposes of gaining certain 
political or economic benefits.
25
 The implication 
that „disguised‟ ethno-businesses (resting on 
incentives) can be separated from „true‟ 
representation (based on wishful thinking) also 
invites state intrusion. Generous declarations on 
the right to freely choose individual ethnic 
affiliation and cultural preferences are obviously 
an important achievement of modern human 
rights law. Nevertheless, the entire situation 
generates strong incentives for the state and 
activist machinery to limit people‟s ability to 
choose, and there are numerous lawful devices 
for either direct or indirect coercion.  
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In practice, all this may entail qualifications, 
restrictions, bans and obligations for individuals. 
Eventually, the result may end up mirroring a 
situation where state bureaucracy hand in hand 
with ethnic activists decides who is entitled to 
what. The current enthusiasm of the normative 
scholarship on the promotion of NTA as a 
universally applicable model may lead to 
negligence of the harm this model can cause to 
real people.  
 
Third, there is an issue of public positive 
obligations towards the support of minority 
educational and cultural institutions still being 
only vaguely conceptualized in international 
instruments and theoretical debates. The idea 
that the funding of NTA is to be held as the 
unquestionable duty of public authorities would 
likely artificially multiply the number of people 
who consider themselves victims of human 
rights violations (i.e. underfunding in this 
context.) 
 
VI. BACKGROUND ISSUES 
Two issues not directly related to the origins of 
NTA in fact have had a strong impact on the 
moral atmosphere surrounding the autonomy 
debates. These magical idioms of „self-
determination‟ and „preservation‟ or „survival‟ 
of „cultures‟ or „identities‟ are not necessary 
components in the rationalizations and 
justifications of NTA,
26
 but there is much 
evidence that they weigh heavily in the back of 
many scholars‟ minds. 
 
The concept of „self-determination‟ has 
been borrowed by several social disciplines from 
the legal domain. It has a high moral status and 
definitely reasserts the groupist attitudes to 
social reality, but beyond this it is not clear what 
added value it brings about into the scholarly 
debates.  
 
In the legal domain, „self-determination‟ 
with regard to „nations‟ and „peoples‟ initially 
concerned nation- and state-building on the basis 
of territorially defined collectives and thus dealt 
with the external configuration of statehood. The 
UN Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, approved by 
the United Nations General Assembly in its 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 
gave birth to the doctrine of „internal self-
determination‟, which initially merely envisaged 
democratic participation of the populace in 
governance on the grounds of equality.
27
  
Gradually, the subsequent professional debates 
among legal scholars and political theorists have 
given rise to a broader interpretation within 
which the self-organization of groups and the 
acquisition of certain sub-national statuses of 
groups began to be interpreted as a subset of the 
self-determination concept.
28
 Numerous scholars 
have put forward and have justified further 
recognition of this right with respect to national 
and ethnic groups being able to set up and assert 
their autonomy at a sub-national level.
29
 
 
As a result, the arguments of many 
authors rest their foundation on the belief that 
NTA is backed with some legal and moral 
imperative relating to the notion that each and 
every ethnic group is ultimately entitled to some 
type of group sovereignty and ability to claim 
and freely exercise the principle of self- 
determination, even if only in collective non-
territorial forms. However, the idea of self-
determination is far from being clear, and even 
legal professionals are a ways away from 
reaching consensus on even the basics of the 
concept. One may legitimately ask whether it 
makes sense to exclude issues such as 
sovereignty and self-determination from 
discussions on how the notion of NTA can be 
utilized.  
 
Also, from a legal perspective, there are 
no clear reasons to treat „self-determination‟ as 
something other than a fictive norm. In other 
words, this formula, which is present within 
many international instruments, may look like a 
legal norm, but it lacks clarity in regard to its 
content, right holders, obligation bearers and the 
very opportunity of its normative, i.e. uniform 
repetitive application. If one discards the very 
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utilization of this notion, everything falls into 
place. As for the political science perspective, 
the notion of self-determination in international 
instruments and activities of international 
organizations can be easily interpreted as a 
typical „lock-in‟ – an inefficient but persistent 
institutional setting.     
 
The notion of cultural preservation looks 
similarly dubious. First of all, the whole 
interpretation of ethnic cultures as being 
attributes of individual groups, on its face, seems 
to be highly questionable. Second, the 
theoretical debates in political theory and moral 
philosophy of recent decades fall short from 
providing a well-grounded argument in favour 
of treating ethnic cultures as a common and 
universal value per se. Third, there is no 
international legal standard prescribing 
preservation by all means necessary of what can 
be regarded as group cultures. However, if one 
regards the preservation of certain cultural traits 
not as a universal, but as a particularistic value, 
which legitimately deserves negotiation and 
accommodation – everything falls into place 
again. 
 
Of course, there is a move in this direction 
within some soft law instruments and in 
professional debates. The UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, in 
its Article 1 (1), stipulates that „States shall 
protect the existence and the national or ethnic, 
cultural, religious and linguistic identity of 
minorities within their respective territories and 
shall encourage conditions for the promotion of 
that identity.‟ General Comment 23 of the UN 
Human Rights Committee‟s General 
Recommendation states in paragraph 6.2 that 
„positive measures by States may also be 
necessary to protect the identity of a minority 
and the rights of its members to enjoy and 
develop their culture and language and to 
practice their religion, in community with the 
other members of the group.‟ However, these 
two most radical provisions belong to the 
domain of soft law and are not binding in the 
strict sense. The other relevant instruments 
referring to cultural rights and the values of 
cultural diversity are even further from being 
rigidly interpreted.
30
  
 
VII. WHAT ABOUT THE ADDED 
VALUE OF NTA? 
If the notion of NTA were imagined as a large 
container, it would be absolutely over-flowing 
with the all-too-many kinds of human activities 
which would claim the right to be stored within. 
Again, this may press one to back up and 
question the value of NTA in the first place. 
Placing the tag of „autonomy‟ on social 
networking, all kinds of segregation patterns, 
claim-making and mobilization, social activism 
and clienteles can tell nothing about the nature 
and origins of these phenomena. There is little 
help in labeling as „autonomous‟ those public 
institutions, which function in the areas of 
culture and education, for the reasons that they 
are being separated along ethnic or linguistic 
lines. The same is equally true for voluntary 
non-governmental organizations established on 
ethnic grounds. Those scholars who study 
conflict resolution, power-sharing arrangements, 
the integration of immigrants or debates about 
the meaning of multiculturalism can do without 
resorting to such a notion as NTA, and can not 
only cope but could even more clearly express 
themselves and defend their arguments with 
alternative terminology and research tools which 
are already in place. 
 
Likewise, the validity of normative 
models such as minority representative councils 
with public competences, based on doubtful 
assumptions and containing unclear perspectives 
regarding practical utilization (as outlined 
above), must be also put under question mark as 
normative models even though they might be 
workable solutions in individual situations. If 
one rejects the major groupist assumption and its 
derivatives, which are the basic building blocks 
of the ideas that form the foundation of NTA, 
then the entire construction falls like a house of 
cards. In the light of all this, is there any room 
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for the usage of NTA as an analytical category 
free from considering ethnicities as ontological 
groups and cohesive social entities?  
 
The suggested answer is that there are 
only two thematic areas where there is a room 
for NTA‟s application without having to accept 
groupist implications. One may, first, single out 
the type of policies which have been designed 
for the accommodation and facilitation of 
collective activities and pursued on behalf of 
identity-based groups, and which imply special 
treatment and encouragement of such activities 
and organizations, while at the same time 
denoting for its use a generic-sounding term 
such as „policies of non-territorial autonomy‟. 
One may conditionally refer in this manner to 
those top-down strategies and arrangements 
(including rhetorical exercises) which purport 
the need to create conditions for the self-
organization and activity of ethnic groups as 
such. In other words, within the framework of 
„NTA policies‟, public authorities behave as if 
there were ethnic groups per se in need of self-
organization and empowerment; it is the 
government - but not scholars or other external 
observers - who reify ethnicities and attribute 
agency thereto. Of course, these types of policies 
may also include attempts to organize an ethnic 
group into a corporate entity based on personal 
membership and then granted the competences 
to carry out certain public functions. Therefore, 
one can single out a more or less distinguishable 
class of top-down discourse and institutional 
settings; needless to say that applying this 
approach to ethnic politics in general would 
make the whole category too broad and 
meaningless because most ethnicity-based 
claims rest on the ideas of group agency. 
  
The second possible approach belongs 
to the domain of public administration and refers 
to the combination of self-government with 
regular allocation of public resources. While in 
philosophy „autonomy‟ is specified as the 
independence and free will of the „self‟; in law 
and political science the same term would, on 
the other hand, indicate the relative and partial 
independence of the „part‟ with respect to the 
„whole entity‟. One can assume that „autonomy‟ 
becomes an appropriate term here when certain 
institutional arrangements based on independent 
decision-making processes exist as either 
integral parts of national diversity policies or as 
national cultural and educational policies. In 
other words, the word „autonomy‟ should apply 
not to groups or imaginary all-embracing public 
law corporations, but to autonomous sub-
systems of the decision-making and the 
provision of services in education and culture, 
which exist beyond - and in addition to - regular 
political processes and administration. 
 
This approach would delineate a certain 
sphere of policies and administration where 
public authorities could collaborate or engage in 
partnerships with civil society. In practical 
terms, NTA as a set of principles may cover a 
broad range of diverse arrangements such as 
public-private partnerships or non-governmental 
organizations, which are granted public 
regulatory competences or functions in, for 
example, areas such as service deliveries or 
standard-setting in training and education. The 
range of possible organizational forms may 
stretch from corporate entities which are 
integrated into state machinery (as suggested by 
Karl Renner) through „administrative 
democracy‟31 – i.e. the incorporation of elected 
or expert bodies into regular public decision-
making processes, all the way to NGOs which 
are subsidized on a regular basis from public 
budgets. In essence, the meaning of NTA may 
be what is known in different national contexts 
as „new public management‟32 or „indirect 
administration‟33 in the domain of cultural and 
educational policies, i.e. the delegation of public 
functions and competences to non-public-sector 
agents. 
 
In this context, the adjective of „non-
territorial‟, like most other potential adjectives 
(„cultural‟ or „personal‟), are to a certain degree 
problematic. „Functional autonomy‟ turns out to 
be more appropriate; however, „non-territorial‟ 
may also serve as a generic term if we are to 
give respect to the recently established tradition 
of naming ethnicity-based arrangements.  
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These two ways of using the notion of NTA as 
an analytical category apply within a narrow 
framework and are interchangeable with other 
more traditional descriptive approaches such as 
„rights of persons belonging to minorities‟ or 
„special measures targeting minorities‟ or 
„participation of minorities in public life‟. With 
all of this taken into consideration, it is at the 
same time needless to say that the overall study 
of NTA a category of practice and its usage in 
real life with all its meanings and implications 
remains an important and promising area of 
empirical research.
34
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